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ABSTRACT 
 
State Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Korean SOEs 
 
By 
 
Moon Su, Kim 
 
 
Privately owned firms have been believed to be more efficient and perform better than 
state owned firms. Despite the notion, the evidence on state owned firms in Korea is scant.  
After comparing the performances of privately owned firms and government owned firms, 
we find that privately owned firms have lower profitability with a higher debt ratio. However, 
among state owned firms, both partial and full privatization improved profitability while 
reducing employment and liabilities. In summary, our findings support the claim that the less 
controlled a state owned firm is by the government, the more positive impact it will have on 
the firm performance.  
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State Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Korean SOEs 
 
By Moon Su, Kim 
 
 
Privatization, which has started as a part of the denationalization program led by 
Volkswagen, Germany in 1961, is considered to be one of the most successful economy 
policies in last half century. Gibbon(2000) estimated that its global size exceeded a billion 
dollars. One of the main reason for a government all over the world focusing on privatization 
is inefficiency of state owned firms.  
Most of state owned firms are involved in an industry, challenging to exchange and 
distribute appropriately through a market. Which means that a state owned firms usually gets 
engaged in an industry where there is market failure. Especially a natural monopoly industry 
which cost of production is inversely relate to an output at an initial stage of an industry, 
including a rail industry and a communication industry can be referred as such examples. If 
privately owned firms led such industries, there is a possibility that a product is produced at a 
lower level than the requested level of a society and higher prices are set to seek exclusive 
profits, and efficiency of a competitive market is diminished.  
Nevertheless, profit incurred by privatizing a natural monopoly industry has been known to 
decrease as the industry develops and the demand increases. A communication industry of 
South Korea was initiated by the government in order to avoid redundant investment by 
multiple private firms and partially due to lack of funds required to build communication 
network. However, as communication technologies have been developed and the demand for 
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communication has expanded, cost efficiency for natural monopoly has dwindled and benefit 
of a competitive market has relatively increased.  
Many studies also suggest that privatization improves firm’s performance as Price 
Waterhouse (1989) mentions that the objectives of privatization are increasing economic 
efficiency and introducing competition. Vining and Boardman (1992) argues that privately 
owned firms are more profitable and efficient than state owned enterprises in Canada. 
Dwenter and Malatesta (2001) finds that privately owned firms are more profitable, use less 
debt, and have smaller labor intensity analyzing 500 largest firms in the world. 
Despite the importance of the issue, however, there have been only few studies which 
conducted empirical research on privatization in Korea. This research attempts to fill the gap.  
To examine the issue, we use three different approaches. First, we carry out a large sample 
cross-sectional comparison of privately owned firms with state owned firms. It is the similar 
way of Dewenter and Malatesta(2001), but our data includes 23 state owned firms from 1986 
to 2006 unlike previous research using limited number of Korean firms(see 
Megginson(2005)). In addition, our sample includes top 30 listed firms and government 
invested institutions in Korea while they use the data from reported in Fortune magazine. 
Surprisingly, our analysis offers a conflicting result. The result is that state owned firms have 
superior profitability and lower leverage than privately owned firms.  
Second, we examine the effect of partial privatization in Korea. Gupta (2005) suggests that 
partial privatization make it easy to discriminate between political and managerial 
perspective because firm is controlled by government while firm’s shares are traded. In other 
words, we can check managerial perspective which is the problem cause by monitoring 
managers under principle-agent problem, main issue in the inefficiency of state owned firms. 
Our analysis targeting government invested companies and their government stake shows that 
the performance of firms considerably improved when the government reduces its ownership. 
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Third, we also explore the before and after effect of privatization of 3state-owned firms. 
The firms are privatized after Asian currency crisis in 1997-1998. Although lack of samples 
limit generalization of our finding, the result shows that privatization improves the 
performance of firms.  
This study provides unique contributions to extant research on Korean SOEs. Our study 
presents the interesting results that historically Korea state owned firms have better 
performance unlike common knowledge we know. More importantly, to our knowledge, we 
provide the first evidence on the effect of partial privatization on firm performance in Korea.  
This paper consists of 4 sections. Section one explains other studies about privatization and 
Section two to four introduce the data, the test methodology, and the result of cross sectional 
comparison of privately owned and state owned firms, partial privatization, and full 
privatization. Section five concludes the study. 
 
I. Literature Review 
 
Does transfer of ownership from government to private really improve the performance in 
reality? Privatization has been ongoing during the past half century. So, there has been 
enough time and empirical evidences to prove whether privately owned firms are more 
efficient than state owned firms or not and whether privatization is right way to improve state 
owned firms economic performance or not. Here, we introduce two kinds of studies. One is 
researches about the financial and operating performance depending on ownership of firms. 
And the other one is studies about the performance of privatized firms before and after 
privatization. 
 
a. State owned firm versus privately owned firm 
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Boardman and Vining(1989) examine the profitability and efficiency of private 
corporations, state-owned enterprises, and mixed enterprises which means some portion of its 
stock is in private hands and some portion of its stock is in public hands among 500 largest 
manufacturing and mining companies in the world except U.S as made by Fortune in 1983. 
They use return on equity, return on assets, return on sales, and net income as measures of 
profitability, and sales per employee and sales per asset as measures of efficiency. The result 
is that the performance of mixed enterprises and state-owned enterprises are significantly 
worse than private corporations. And the profitability of mixed enterprises is somewhat lower 
than state-owned enterprises. So, they argue that mixed enterprise which is partially 
privatized may show lower profitability than state-owned enterprise and private corporation 
because of ‘managerial cognitive dissonance’ caused by confliction between public 
shareholders and private shareholders. 
Dewenter and Malatesta(2001) compare performances between privately owned companies 
and state-owned companies using data from 1975, 1985 and 1995, Fortune reported on the 
500 largest corporations. The result is that state-owned companies are significantly less 
profitable than privately owned companies, and tend to use more leverage and greater labor 
intensity than privately owned companies. 
 
b. Privatization and firm performance 
 
Many empirical studies support that privatization improves the economic performances. 
D’Souza and Megginson(1999) examine the before and after privatization economic 
performance of 85 companies from 28 countries(especially utility and telecommunication 
industries) privatized in a way of public share offerings from 1990 to 1996. The result is that 
privatized companies significantly improve their economic performances after 
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privatization(significant increase in profitability, real sales, operation efficiency and dividend 
payout, insignificant decrease in employment levels and investment ratio. Gupta (2005) 
examines the effect of partial privatization having the advantage of checking managerial 
perspective as stated earlier. The author uses the data of 40 companies partially privatized 
from the federal government and two companies sold by regional governments in India 
during 10 years period from 1990 to 2000, and finds that the companies partially privatized 
have significant improvement on profitability, investment, and labor productivity.  
Dewenter and Malatesta(2001) examine the before and after privatization short periods(+1 
to +3 and -3 to -1) and long period(+1 to +5 and -10 to -1) performances of 63 companies 
from 1981 to 1984. The result shows that significant decrease in leverage after privatization, 
and the profitability mainly increase 3 years before privatization. It means government 
restructures state-owned companies successfully before selling them. Martin and Parker(1995) 
examine the performance of eleven firms in Britain such as British Airways, British Gas, 
British Steel, British Telecom, and so on, which are privatized in the 1980s. And the 
indicators of performance are profitability and value-added per employee relative to value-
added in the economy. The result shows that the value-added growth improves when the 
privatization announces, and it goes down right away after privatization. Productivity growth 
is also lower than rest of economy in both the after privatization and recession period. 
 
There is a limited number of studies about privatization and an empirical analysis of 
privatized firms in Korea. Joo Kyung Tae & Sung Sig Yoon(2006) analyze efficiency of 
privatization with a production functional model, a cost functional model and functional 
performance based on the data collected from Dacome, Samsung Fine Chemical, Donghae 
Pulp, SK telecom, Kia Steel, and LG Metal, privatized in the 90s, from early 80s to 90s. 
According to the analysis, privatized firms are mainly concerned about output factor 
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including a high price and increased sales, rather cost factors including the cost and labor 
costs. For most of studied corporations, financial performance has aggravated after 
privatization as well as its efficiency rate. Lack of competition, government controls and 
other complicated matters seem to contribute on such consequences.  
Kim Hyun Sook(2007) makes an empirical review on enhancement on business 
performance and efficiency based on comparison of data from 7 firms, which are once owned 
by the nation and then privatized in late 90s and early 2000, for 3 years before and after the 
privatization. For the review, medians before and after the privatization are compared and so 
as with of the control group through Wilcoxon rank sum inspection, according to the method 
of Megginson et al(1994). The analysis reveals that privatization positively affects 
profitability and productivity but not a debt rate and an employment rate.  
This study can be differentiated from these previous studies due to following factors. First, 
previous studies merely focus on an empirical analysis of privatization. Unlike them, we 
compare the economic performance between state owned firms and privately owned firms. 
Not only that, we examine changes in a performance according to partial privatization of a 
state owned firms. Second, on this study, we use rather than analyzing data of specific state 
owned firms, data from every state owned firms except financial firms controlled by the 
Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institution in 21 years, from 
1986 to 2006, is analyzed. 
 
II. A comparison between privately owned firms and State owned firms 
 
a. Data 
 
We construct two different samples to investigate the impact of state ownership. We match 
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state owned firms with the top 30 firms1 by assets among listed companies in Korea each 
year. State owned firms2 are defined following the definition of the Framework Act on the 
Management of Government-Invested Institutions. We exclude financial firms. We use the 
samples for a 21 year period, starting from 1986 to 2006. All the information such as sales, 
assets, employees, and others is on the basis of each firm’s balance sheet. 
  The final data includes 973 firm-year observations. 630 of them are for privately owned 
firms, and 54% of them belong to manufacturing industries according to the KSIC codes. On 
the other hand, it is hard to distinguish the main industry of state owned firms because they 
are consisted of a variety of different industries such as public administration (20%), 
construction (12%), and real estate activities (12%). 
We use descriptive statistics to compare the size between the two groups. The average 
value of annual assets for privately owned firms is 4,956 billion won, which is less than the 
average value of 5,861 billion won of state owned firms. In terms of sales standards, privately 
owned firms amount to 5,015 billion won, which is three times higher than the average value 
of 1,679 billion won of state owned firms. When comparing the medians, the figure of assets 
and sales for privately owned firms is respectively 3,279 billion, and 2,503 billion won 
whereas the average for state owned firms comes to 791 billion, 282 billion won.  
 
b. Methods 
 
Our question is to test whether privately owned firms have better performance than state 
owned firms, following Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). To estimate performance, we 
examine the key indicators of profitability, labor intensity, and leverage. We measure 
                                                 
1. We use TS2000 program by Korea Listed Companies Association for gathering accounting information. 
2.The data is from ‘The balance sheet of the government invested institution’ published by the government. 
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profitability with return on total assets (ROA), and return on sales (ROS). For the measuring 
labor intensity, we introduce two different methods. Employees by total assets and employees 
by sales, and for leverage, we calculate total liabilities divided by total assets. 
We first calculate the mean of each indicator to make a simple comparison, and divide the 
21 year period into three periods (1986-1992, 1993-1999, 2000-2006) in order to see the 
periodic characteristics. We then perform multivariate regression to see the relative 
performances of state owned firms using the year fixed effect and the firm fixed effect to 
control for year and industry factors which affect the indicators as we mention above. 
 
c. Results 
 
The results are not what we expect; State owned firms have higher profitability and lower 
leverage than privately owned ones. The ROS of privately owned firms is 0.019, which is a 
third of state owned firms, and their difference is statistically significant at the level of 1%. 
Also, privately owned firms turn out to have a liabilities to assets ratio of 0.705 compared to 
those of the state owned firms with a liabilities to assets ratio of 0.573. The difference is also 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. State owned firms are expected to show a higher 
leverage due to lax management and lower interest rates driven by the governmental debt 
guarantees. Instead, privately-owned firms show a higher debt ratio.  
The results from the Dewenter and Malatesta(2001), and the analysis model employed for 
our research, show that the profitability and leverage of privately owned firms are far better 
than the ones of state owned firms, which is opposite to our results. However, when it comes 
to labor intensity, State owned firms have a tendency to use more labor than privately owned 
ones, which match the results from the analysis model. Privately owned firms produce lower 
figures in both the employees to assets ratio and the employees to sales ratio, while the 
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difference between state owned and privately owned firms is statistically significant at 1 %.  
 
Table1 
Univariate tests: Privately owned firms VS State owned firms 
This table shows a comparison of a performance of a state owned firms(government invested institutions) with 
of top 30 privately owned firms for 21 years from 1986 to 2006. To clearly see features of each period, a period 
of 21 years are divided into 3 periods (1986-1992, 1993-1999, 2000-2006) to be compared.  
 
Privately 
owned firms 
average (a) 
observation
State 
owned firms 
average (b) 
observation 
t-statistics for 
difference (a-b)
Total 
Return on assets 0.021 630 0.021 342 -0.000 
Return on sales 0.019 630 0.056 342 -0.036*** 
Employees/assets 3.898 630 5.790 343 -1.892*** 
Employees/sales 4.790 630 11.292 342 -6.501*** 
Liabilities/assets 0.705 630 0.573 343 0.132*** 
86-92 
Return on assets 0.014 210 0.036 142 -0.022*** 
Return on sales 0.010 210 0.104 142 -0.094*** 
Employees/assets 7.919 210 9.441 143 -1.522 
Employees/sales 9.300 210 18.461 142 -9.161*** 
Liabilities/assets 0.775 210 0.518 143 0.257*** 
93-99 
Return on assets 0.004 210 0.006 107 -0.002 
Return on sales -0.004 210 0.025 107 -0.029 
Employees/assets 2.484 210 3.324 107 -0.839* 
Employees/sales 3.555 210 8.179 107 -4.624*** 
Liabilities/assets 0.758 210 0.613 107 0.145*** 
00-06 
Return on assets 0.045 210 0.017 93 0.028*** 
Return on sales 0.053 210 0.017 93 0.036 
Employees/assets 1.292 210 3.014 93 -1.722** 
Employees/sales 1.516 210 3.925 93 -2.409*** 
Liabilities/assets 0.581 210 0.610 93 -0.029 
 
* p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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From 1986 to 1992, state owned firms demonstrate higher profitability, while privately 
owned firms finally catch up with them from 2000 to 2006. Although they both show lower 
labor intensity than before, privately owned firms are more labor-intensive than state owned 
firms. Meanwhile, privately owned firms have a higher leverage in the past, but now, state 
owned and privately owned firms recently report similar ratios.  
 
Table2. 
Regression results: Relative performance of state owned firms 
(Top 30 privately owned firms as benchmark) 
This table shows a regression analysis of a business performance of a state owned firms(government invested 
institutions) with top 30 privately owned firms (based on assets) for 21 years from 1986 to 2006, with the firm 
fixed effect and the year fixed effect. To estimate a business performance, ROA and ROS, which measures 
productivity, and employees to assets and employees to sales which reveal labor intensity are used along with 
liabilities to assets, which measures a leverage. Dgov is dummy variable distinguishing state owned firms from 
privately owned firms. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory 
variables 
ROA ROS 
Employees 
/assets 
Employees 
/sales 
Liabilities 
/assets 
Dgov 
0.021** 
(2.63) 
0.019 
(0.48) 
1.849 
(1.42) 
-2.078 
(-0.47) 
-0.301*** 
(-3.30) 
ln asset 
-0.014** 
(-3.02) 
0.026 
(1.12) 
-4.126*** 
(-3.63) 
3.433** 
(2.34) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
ln sales 
0.019** 
(3.41) 
-0.020 
(-0.64) 
2.231** 
(2.58) 
-3.208** 
(-2.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.19) 
Constant 
-0.037 
(-0.91) 
-0.041 
(-0.24) 
36.472*** 
(4.81) 
7.932 
(1.00) 
0.779*** 
(3.24) 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Observation 972 972 973 713 714 
Pseudo R-squared   0.097 0.126 -2.327 
 
 * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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 Table 2 illustrates the relative performance of state owned firms compared with that of 
privately owned firms based on a regression analysis controlling for year and industry factors. 
The Dgov coefficient of the ROA, one of the profitability indicators, is a positive number and 
statistically significant at 5%. The coefficient on the Dgov of the liability to assets, leverage, 
is -0.301, which is highly significant. For labor intensity, the coefficients of the two 
measurements are that one shows positive numbers while the other one shows negative 
numbers. However they are not statistically significant. The results indicate that state owned 
firms have higher profitability and lower leverage than privately owned firms. Simply put, 
state owned firms perform better.  
However, this comparison can be limited in terms of the methods of analysis and time 
background. The sample group of state owned firms includes various industries such as 
public administration, construction, and real-estate development, while half of the samples of 
privately owned firms is consisted of the manufacturing businesses. Accordingly, when the 
two groups are compared, the industrial characteristics in each group can be ignored. In 
addition, considering that the early stages of the economic development in Korea are led by 
the government, we cannot ignore the state owned firms with their monopolistic market 
power. Thus, more careful judgment is required for the results of the analysis. Considering 
these limitations, in the next section, we exclude private companies, and examine the state 
owned firms’ performance based on changes of the government stake. 
 
III. Partial privatization and performance analysis 
 
a. Data and method 
 
The sample for partial privatization includes government-invested institutions designated 
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by the Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions from 1986 to 
2006 and excludes financial organizations. A total of 23 firms are observed with 343 samples. 
For accounting information and government stake, the sample firms’ balance sheet and 
income statements are used. In particular, for government stakes, to clarify the ownership of 
the firm, pure government stakes excluding stakes held by public institutions and 
government-run banks are considered.  
In this section, to overcome the aforementioned limitations, instead of raising a question on 
whether privately owned firms are more effective than state owned firms, the research 
explores another question; whether the privatization of state owned firms, especially partial 
privatization, has a positive effect on their management performance. In other words, it 
explores the relationship between a decrease in government stake in state owned firms and 
their performance.  
Performance indicators include profitability, labor intensity, and leverage which are also 
employed for the comparison between privately owned and state owned firms, while ROA 
and ROS are utilized for measuring profitability. For labor intensity, employees to assets and 
employees to sales are used while for leverage, liabilities to assets are used. To understand 
how the indicators change when government shares in a state owned firm increases, the 
multiple regression analysis is employed. To control for year and industry factors during the 
analysis, the year fixed effect and the firm fixed effect are also used.  
 
b. Results 
 
 Table3 shows that the more shares the government has in a public institution, the more 
negative effects it has on all performance indicators which are independent variables. The 
coefficients for the ROA and ROS to measure performance are negative numbers and are 
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statistically significant at 1% and 5% respectively. The results suggest that state owned firm 
with a higher government stake has lower profitability. In other words, lower government 
stake could lead to higher profitability. For example, when the ROS coefficient is -0.457 and 
the government stake drops from 100% to 50%, a 0.229(-0.457*-0.5) increase in return on 
sales 
 
Table 3 
Regression results: Relative performance of state owned firms when government shares increase 
This table shows a regression analysis of a business performance of a state owned firms(government invested 
institutions) due to partial privatization for 21 years from 1986 to 2006, with the firm fixed effect and the year 
fixed effect. To estimate a business performance, ROA and ROS, which measures productivity, and employees 
to assets and employees to sales which reveal labor intensity are used along with liabilities to assets, which 
measures leverage. Gov_shr is dummy variable distinguishing state owned firms with higher government stake 
from state owned firms with lower government stake. 
 Dependent Variables 
Explanatory 
variables ROA ROS 
Employees 
/assets 
Employees 
/sales 
Liabilities 
/assets 
Gov_shr -0.082*** (-3.12) 
-0.457** 
(-2.19) 
6.321* 
(1.75) 
12.046 
(1.45) 
0.308* 
(1.87) 
ln asset -0.017*** (-3.88) 
0.037 
(1.16) 
-6.150*** 
(-5.19) 
-0.244 
(-0.16) 
0.018 
(0.38) 
ln sales 0.020*** (3.84) 
-0.036 
(-0.91) 
4.247*** 
(3.83) 
-3.618 
(-1.42) 
-0.026 
(-0.53) 
Constant 0.093** (2.48) 
0.489 
(1.51) 
36.246*** 
(4.49) 
56.910*** 
(3.58) 
0.266 
(1.06) 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Observation 342 342 342 342 342 
Pseudo R-squared   0.128 0.056 0.317 
 
* p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
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For labor intensity, the coefficient for employees to assets is a positive number, 6.321 and 
statistically significant. It means that an increase in government stake results in more 
employment by state owned firms. It joins the conclusions of most research, pointing out the 
high employment rate of public companies, meaning that public companies hire more 
workers than private businesses (Maxim Boycko et al, 1996) and that privatization could lead 
to reduction in employment (D’Souza and Megginson, 1999). In addition, the coefficient for 
employees to sales is 12.046, two times higher than that of employees to assets. As its 
statistical significance is about 15%, which is lower than usual but still significant, and the 
figure supports the research’s argument on the relationship between government stake and 
employment. The coefficient for liabilities to assets is a positive 0.308 and statistically 
significant at 10%. In short, leverage is in direct proportion to government stake.  
According to the analysis, as government stake in a state owned firm decreases, its 
profitability improves while employment and debt contract. It indicates that partial 
privatization has a positive effect on profitability, labor intensity, and leverage. In the next 
section, the research examines the close relationship between government stake and its 
economic performance through performance analysis on fully-privatized state owned firms.  
 
IV. Privatization and performance analysis 
 
a. Data and method 
 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 to 1998, the Korean government 
announced ‘The privatization and innovation in management plans for state owned 
companies’ to improve management efficiency of state owned firms by introducing 
competition principles for them, and establishing responsible management. At that time, 
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privatized firms were National Textbooks, KTB Investment & Securities, DOPCO, POSCO, 
Hankook Heavy Industries (present Doosan Heavy Industries), KT, and KT&G. Among them, 
we choose three public corporations, Doosan Heavy Industries, KT, and KT&G for our 
analysis since those firms are government invested institutions before privatization. 
The performance comparison between before and after privatization is to be studied using 
the regression analysis for the time period from ten years before privatization to five years 
afterwards or as short as from three years before privatization to three years afterwards, as in 
the study of Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). However, since the number of samples are 
limited and that data is not enough, the time series comparison and simple average 
comparison approaches are used. We use graphs to compare the performances of three 
privatized firms for a 16 year period including 10 years before and 5 years after privatization 
performance of the privatized firms, and find the differences by testing simple average 
comparison of performance indicators before and after privatization. The indicators include 
profitability, labor intensity, and leverage.  
 
b. change of performance 
 
Figures 1 and 2 depict the changes in the ROA and ROS of state owned firms, and 
performance measurements for 16 years (ten years before privatization and five years 
afterwards) in graphs. The averages from both are on the increase after privatization, which 
means their profitability is also rising. What is peculiar about those graphs are that 
profitability indicators for KT go up before privatization, but after that, they steeply decline 
for a while and surge again.  
 
 
16 
 
Figure 1. Times series of average ROA(return on assets), one of profitability measures 
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Note: Vertical, horizontal axis depicts ratio and event year respectively. Year 0 is when privatization occurred. 
 
Figure 2. Times series of average ROS (return on sales), one of profitability measures 
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Note: Vertical, horizontal axis depicts ratio and event year respectively. Year 0 is when privatization occurred. 
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Figure 3. Times series of average employees to assets, one of labor intensity measures 
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Note: Vertical, horizontal axis depicts ratio and event year respectively. Year 0 is when privatization occurred. 
 
Figure 4. Times series of average employees to sales, one of labor intensity measures 
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Note: Vertical, horizontal axis depicts ratio and event year respectively. Year 0 is when privatization occured. 
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Figure 5. Times series of average liabilities to assets, leverage measure 
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Note: Vertical, horizontal axis depicts ratio and event year respectively. Year 0 is when privatization occurred. 
 
According to Figures 3 and 4, two graphs for employees to assets and employees to sales 
show that the firms’ labor intensity goes down as time goes by, which means their 
productivity improves. What is noticeable is that labor intensity improves remarkably before 
privatization, but there is no remarkable improvement right before or after privatization.  
Figure 5 is a graph for liabilities to assets which represents leverage. For KT and KT&G, 
the liabilities to assets is on a sharp rise just before privatization and then declines after 
privatization, while that of Doosan Heavy steadily goes down. 
Table 4 is a simple average comparison of three state owned firms’ profitability, labor 
intensity, and leverage before and after privatization. Two approaches are used to set the 
period for the comparison of performance indicators; first, comparison of the averages for ten 
years before privatization, and those for five years afterwards, Second, comparison of the 
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averages for three years before privatization, and those for three years afterwards.  
 
Table 4 
Simple average comparison of performance measures before and after privatization 
This table shows simple average comparison with two approaches; First, long term comparison of the averages 
for ten years before privatization, and those for five years afterwards, second, short term comparison of the 
averages for three years before privatization and those for three years afterwards. 
  
Pre years 
(-10,-1) 
Post years
(+1,+5) 
Difference
Pre years
(-3,-1) 
Post years 
(+1,+3) 
Difference
Profitability       
Return 
on assets average 0.057  0.074  0.018  0.044 0.063 0.019 
 
Doosan 
Heavy 0.058  0.024  -0.034 0.013 0.014 0.001 
 KT 0.032  0.057  0.024  0.036 0.053 0.018 
 KT&G 0.079  0.142  0.063  0.082 0.122 0.040 
Return 
on sales average 0.082  0.120 0.038  0.095 0.104 0.009 
 
Doosan 
Heavy 0.064  0.034  -0.030 0.020 0.017 -0.003 
 KT 0.066  0.089  0.023  0.077 0.087 0.010 
 KT&G 0.117  0.237  0.120  0.189 0.208 0.019 
Labor intensity       
Employees 
to assets average 3.337  1.582  -1.754 1.738 1.663 -0.075 
 
Doosan 
Heavy 3.772  1.595  -2.177 1.994 1.877 -0.117 
 KT 4.013  2.011  -2.001 1.966 1.970 0.004 
 KT&G 2.225  1.141  -1.084 1.254 1.143 -0.111 
Employees 
to sales average 5.165  2.400 -2.765 3.430 2.506 -0.924 
 
Doosan 
Heavy 4.486  2.111  -2.375 2.985 2.369 -0.616 
 KT 8.183  3.181  -5.002 4.416 3.209 -1.207 
 KT&G 2.826  1.908  -0.918 2.889 1.940 -0.949 
Leverage        
liabilities  
to assets average 0.500 0.426  -0.074 0.451 0.433 -0.017 
 
Doosan 
Heavy 0.711  0.510 -0.201 0.609 0.488 -0.121 
 KT 0.578  0.573  -0.005 0.481 0.612 0.131 
 KT&G 0.211  0.196  -0.015 0.263 0.200 -0.062 
 
After comparing the averages of the long-term and short-term periods, the results are the 
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same; for most firms studied, profitability increases while labor intensity and debt-ratio 
declines, thus suggesting that performance indicators are improved after privatization.  
Both the time series comparison and simple average comparison indicate that privatization 
has a positive impact on the performance of state owned firms. This also supports the 
argument in the last section that when the government stake decreases, a firm’s economic 
performance improves.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This research starts with a question of whether privately owned firms perform better than 
state owned firms. The privately owned firms’ sample group includes top 30 businesses in 
terms of assets, while the state owned firms’ sample group targets government-invested 
institutions, and their performances are compared to find an answer to the question. The 
result is not what we expect; privately owned firms report lower profitability with a higher 
debt ratio than state owned firms. In addition, the results from the univariate comparison and 
the multivariate regression using the firm fixed effect and the year fixed effect indicate the 
same.  
However, there is a certain limit in this comparison due to government owned firm’s 
monopolistic market position and the different industrial characteristics between sample 
groups of privately owned firms and state owned firms.  
Therefore, considering solely on state owned firms we analyze how change in government 
stake has effect on state owned firm’s performance. First, the performance analysis for partial 
privatization is carried out to find out the impact of a decrease in the government stake on 
performance. The results suggest that the less stake the government has in the government 
owned firms, the more its profitability increases, while employment and liabilities decrease. 
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To learn whether the same case can be made for fully privatized firms, we check the 
performance before and after privatization of three privatized firms during the Asian financial 
crisis. It is confirmed that as in partial privatization, these firm’s performances improve after 
privatization.    
This research suggests that there is a close relationship between the state ownership and 
firm’s economic performance, while less state ownership means better performance.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Government Invested Institutions (1986-2006) 
Name Period Privatization 
Korea Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Chemical Corporation 1986-1993 2000.12 
Korea Coal Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Electric Power Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Exchange 1986-1987 - 
Korea Expressway Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Gas Corporation 1986-1996 - 
Korea Land Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Minting and Security Printing Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea National Housing Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea National Oil Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Overseas Development Corporation 1986-1991 - 
Korea Railroad Corporation 2005-2006 - 
Korea Resources Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Rural Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Telecom 1986-1996 2002.05 
Korea Tobacco & Ginseng 1987-1996 2002.10 
Korea Tourism Organization 1986-2006 - 
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 1986-2006 - 
Korea Water Resources Corporation 1986-2006 - 
Korea Workers' Compensation & Welfare Service 1986-1994 - 
Korean Broadcasting System 1986-1988 - 
National Textbook Corporation 1986-1993 1998.11(Merged) 
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